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Butler: Plea Bargain Enforcement

SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT OF
BROKEN PLEA BARGAINS IN
CALIFORNIA: PEOPLE v.
CALLOWAY
I. INTRODUCTION

Since the California Supreme Court approved the practice
of plea bargaining in People v. West,1 the courts have struggled
with determining the proper remedy for a broken plea bargain.
The most common remedy is to allow the defendant to withdraw
his plea. 2 Where a defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange
for an agreed upon disposition of the case, plea withdrawal adequately remedies a resulting broken agreement by returning the
defendant to the pre-plea bargained position.
In certain cases, however, specific enforcement of the plea
bargain may be allowed as an alternative remedy and is most
likely to be available when the agreement is broken by either the
prosecutor or the defendant. When the judge breaks the agreement, California courts are reluctant to order specific enforcement-possibly due to the legislative barriers of Califonia Penal
Code section 1192.5.8 Notwithstanding section 1192.5, specific
enforcement seems the only adequate remedy in situations
where a defendant, in reliance on the agreement, is placed in
such a position that a return to the pre-plea bargained status
quo is impossible. This was the position in which the defendant
found himself in People v. Calloway.·
II. BACKGROUND

A.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

In 1957 the California legislature enacted Penal Code sec1. 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970).
2. E.g., People v. Kaanehe, 19 Cal. 3d 1, 559 P.2d 1028, 136 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1977);

People v. Pinon, 35 Cal. App. 3d 120, 125, 110 Cal. Rptr. 406, 409 (1973).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5 (West 1970).
4. 29 Cal. 3d 666, 631 P.2d 30, 175 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1981).
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tion 1192.3& which provided a limited form of plea bargaining.
Pursuant to that section, a defendant who pled guilty could
specify the punishment to the same extent it could be specified
by a jury. If both the prosecutor and court accepted that specification, the punishment could not exceed that designated. The
subsequent case law requiring that a guilty plea be voluntarily
and intelligently waived on the record may have accounted for
that section's later repeal.
For example, in 1969, the Supreme Court decided Boykin v.
Alabama· which held that a trial record must affirmatively show
that a defendant who pleaded guilty did so voluntarily and intelligently and that he waived the three principal constitutional
rights surrendered by such a plea: the right to trial by jury, the
right to confront one's accusers, and the privilege against selfincrimination." Later that year, the California Supreme Court
decided In re Tahl 8 which explicated the procedures necessitated by Boykin. Boykin and Tahl only involved simple guilty
pleas, but since plea bargains may involve either a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere, the same constitutional rights are waived
and the same requirements apply in either case.
In 1970 the California legislature replaced Penal Code section 1192.3 with section 1192.5.· That section allows the defendant to state the maximum punishment or suspension of sentence. If either the judge or the prosecutor disapproves the
sentencing recommendation, the plea is automatically withdrawn. If the court approves the plea, it must inform the defendant that its approval is not binding and may, at the time set for
the hearing or the application for probation or pronouncement
of judgment, withdraw its approval in light of further consideration. Such withdrawal empowers the defendant to withdraw his
plea. Tpe court must also question the defendant to satisfy itself
that the plea· is freely and voluntarily made and that there is a
factual basis for such a plea.
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.3 (repealed 1970).
6. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
7. Id. at 243-44.
8. 1 Cal. 3d 122, 132, 460 P.2d 449, 456, 81 Cal. Rptr. 677, 584 (1969).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5 (West 1970).
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In People v. West,10 the California Supreme Court approved
a plea bargain in which the defendant pleaded guilty to an offense which offered the trial judge the option for sentencing him
as a misdemeanant. This benefit as not then available for the
crime initially charged, since the lesser offense was not necessarily included within the crime initially charged but only reasonably related to it. Based on this act of leniency, the defendant
tried to renege on the plea agreement. 11 The trial court refused
to allow him to do so.
The Supreme Court noted that, although Penal Code section 1192.5 did not encompass the form of the plea bargain present in West (pleading to a non-included lesser offense), it
demonstrated "the growing legislative recognition and approval
of plea bargaining."ll1 The court perceived section 1192.5 as providing "guidelines which the trial court can utilize in receiving
and considering plea bargains involving pleas to lesser
offenses. "18
In some cases, the courts apparently perceive section 1192.5
as providing guidelines in considering the proper remedy when a
plea agreement is rejected. 14 Because plea withdrawal is the only
remedy mentioned in Penal Code section 1192.5, courts may be
reluctant to allow specific enforcement as an alternative remedy.
B.

DEVELOPMENT IN THE COURTS

The Supreme Court decision in Santobello v. New York1& is
important because it attests to the Court's view that specific enforcement is an option to be considered when determining the
proper remedy for a broken plea bargain. The Court also stated
that plea bargaining "is an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged.
If any criminal case were subjected to a full-scale trial, the states
and federal government would need to multiply by many times
10. 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970).
11. See the vacated opinion of the Court of Appeal at 83 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1970).
12. 3 Cal. 3d at 608, 477 P.2d at 416, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
13. ld.
14. See People v. Calloway, 29 Cal. 3d 666, 631 P.2d 30, 175 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1981);
People v. Johnson, 10 Cal. 3d 868, 519 P.2d 604, 112 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1974).
15. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
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the number of judges and court facilities."l'
Santobello was indicted in New York on two gambling
charges and agreed to plead guilty to a lesser included offense in
exchange for the prosecutor's promise to make no sentencing
recommendation. After prolonged delays, the matter came up
for the probation and sentence hearing, at which a new prosecutor, apparently unaware of the prior agreement, recommended
the maximum sentence. Claiming that the recommendation had
no effect on his decision, the judge imposed the maximum
sentence.17
Mter recognizing that defendants have a constitutional
right to relief for broken plea agreements,ll the then sevenmember Courtl' reversed and remanded to the New York state
courts to determine whether specific performance of the state's
promise with resentencing before a different judge, or recission
of the plea was the appropriate remedy.to The Court sharply divided in determining to what extent the defendant's preference
should be considered by the Court in affording him an appropriate remedy.11
In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas was of the view
that due process requires specific enforcement or the option to
go to trial whenever the prosecutor breaks a plea bargain. tt He
observed that the lower court "ought to accord- a defendant's
preference considerable, if not controlling weight, inasmuch as
the fundamental rights flouted by a prosecutor's breach of a plea
bargain are those of the defendant, not of the state. "ta
16. 1d. at 260.
17.1d.
18. Jd. at 262.
19. Justices Black and Harlan retired prior to the filing of the decision on December
20, 1971. Justices Powell and Rehnquist were not sworn in until January 7, 1972.
20. 404 U.S. at 263.
21. While Justices Burger, White and Blackmun were 8ilent on what weight to give
to the defendant's preference 88 to remedy, Justice Dougl88, concurring, urged that the
defendant'8 preference should be given much weight while Justice Marshall, joined by
Justices Brennan and Stewart, diBBenting, believed that since the defendant here W88
reasonably requesting plea withdrawal, he should be given his chosen remedy. See disCUB8ion accompanying notes 22-25. infra.
22. 404 U.S. at 267.

23.ld.
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Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stewart,
dissented in part, arguing that Santo bello's choice of plea withdrawal should be honored because the prosecutor's breach of the
bargain "undercuts the basis for the waiver of the constitutional
rights implicit in the plea" and furnishes defendant with "ample
justification for rescinding the plea."u Noting that of the seven
members sitting at the time of the decision a majority favored
looking to defendant's wishes,2& Justice Marshall concluded that
the defendant should be allowed to regain his right to trial if
that is what he desires.
While Santobello was a case in which the prosecutor reneged, Justices Marshall and Douglas expressed similar views in
a case where the judge "injected himself into the process."IS
Past California cases have acknowledged the availability of
specific enforcement to a criminal defendant, when a judge had
breached the plea bargained agreement.:n In People v. Delles,1I
decided prior to the enactment of section 1192.5, the defendant
pleaded guilty to a charge of possession of marijuana in return
for a grant of probation upon condition that he serve some time
in county jail. The defendant was granted probation and was
given a short stay before commencing the jail term.1I The judge
was unaware that the defendant had been arrested for selling
narcotics after the bargain was struck. On the day defendant appeared to commence his sentence, the judge stated that he had
learned of the new charge, denied defendant's motion for plea
withdrawal and sentenced him to state prison. so
The California Supreme Court held it was improper to hold
defendant to his guilty plea while denying him the bargained
grant of probation, and therefore the trial court was obligated
either to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea or to grant
24. [d. at 268.
25. [d.

26. Martinez v. Mancusi, 409 U.S. 959 (1972) (Marshall and Douglas, J.J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari). For the court of appeals decision, see United States ex rei.
Mancusi v. Martinez, 455 F.2d 705 (2nd Cir. 1972).
27. See text accompanying notes 28·38, infra.
28. 69 Cal. 2d 906, 447 P.2d 629, 73 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1968).
29. [d. at 908, 447 P.2d at 630, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
30. [d.
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probation despite the new circumstances. 11
Cases heard subsequent to the enactment of section 1192.5
have also mentioned the availability of specific enforcement of a
bargained agreement. In People v. Flores 's defendant pleaded
guilty to one court of first degree robbery in exchange for a dismissal of fourteen remaining counts. When the judge asked the
defendant if he knew the maximum setence that could be imposed, the defendant replied, "five to life."" At sentencing, the
judgment included a recital that defendant had used a firearm
during the robbery which invoked a California statuteM adding a
mandatory consecutive term of five years to his minimum sentence. In setting aside the additional five year term, a unanimous court stated:
[W]here a defendant's guilty plea has been entered as part of a bargain with recognized authorities, and judgment entered contrary to the terms
of the bargain, he may move to have his plea set
aside, or the judgment may be modified to conform with the terms of his bargain. III

Although the court never mentioned the term "specific performance," it noted that defendant was allowed the "benefit of his
plea bargain.""
In People v. Ramos," defendant pleaded guilty to one of
seven counts in exchange for promises to dismiss the remaining
counts, strike five prior convictions, grant probation, and sentence him to no additional time. The court approved the plea
bargain, granted probation, then sentenced defendant to prison
for violating probation on three of the five prior cases. Defendant sought to withdraw his plea, arguing that he understood
the plea bargain covered all cases. In reversing the conviction,
the California Supreme Court held that the trial judge had the
option of allowing withdrawal of the guilty plea or to grant probation not subject to immediate revocation of probation in the
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 910, 447 P.2d at 632, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
6 Cal. 3d 305, 491 P.2d 406, 98 Cal. Rptr. 822 (1971).
Id. at 309, 491 P.2d at 408, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.5 (West 1970).
6 Cal. 3d at 308-09, 491 P.2d at 408, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
36. Id. at 309, 491 P.2d at 408, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
37. 26 Cal. App. 3d 108, 102 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1972).
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other cases. 38
The significance of these cases is that the court recognized
the availability of specific enforcement of a plea bargain as an
alternative to withdrawal of the guilty plea. While both the Delles and Ramos courts left the ultimate decision on the remedy
with the trial court, the Flores court ordered the trial court to
give the defendant the benefit of the bargain.
More recent cases appear to deny the availability of specific
enforcement as an alternative remedy for plea withdrawal. In
People v. Johnson," defendant pleaded guilty to credit card forgery in return for a misdemeanor sentence, suspension of sentence and a. grant of probation. Upon later discovering that defendant had concealed his true name and past criminal record,
the court sentenced him to state prison, contrary to the plea
bargain. Because the court failed to advise Johnson of his right
under section 1192.5 to withdraw his plea, the California Supreme Court reversed. 40
Johnson argued the court's failure to inform him of his right
to withdraw should allow him to opt for specific enforcement as
an alternative,41 but the court found that "implicit in the language of section 1192.5 is the premise that the court upon sentencing has broad discretion to withdraw its prior approval of a
negotiated plea."41 The court also said it was the "serious misrepresentations by the defendant which reinforced the court's
reluctance to create a right of specific performance of a plea bargain whenever the court has failed to advise a defendant of his
rights under Section 1192.5."48
While the court was concerned with the misrepresentation
made during plea negotiations, its remedy for the trial court's
failure to advise Johnson of his right to withdraw his plea appears to have been dictated by section 1192.5 which makes no
38. Id. at 112, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
39. 10 Cal. 3d 868, 519 P.2d 604, 112 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1974).
40. [d. at 873, 519 P.2d at 607, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
41. Id. The main issue in Johnson, however, was whether defendant had a right to
withdraw his plea after the trial court rejected ita prior approval of the negotiated plea
bargain.
42.ld.
43. [d.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982

7

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 7

494

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:487

reference to specific enforcement as an option to the defendant.
Arguably, Johnson can best be understood as standing for the
proposition that a criminal defendant will never be allowed specific enforcement of his plea bargain when the defendant's deception leads to a plea bargain which he would not receive if the
true facts were known.
While Delles, Flores, Ramos and Johnson were cases in
which the defendants sought specific enforcement of the plea
agreement, in People v. Kaanehe,44 the prosecution sought specific enforcement4& while the defendant sought to withdraw his
plea. Although this case involved a breach by the prosecutor, not
the judge, it is significant because the California Supreme Court
gave the defendant the option of withdrawing his plea or obtaining specific. enforcement. 48
In Kaanehe, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of
grand theft in exchange for the prosecutor's promise to refrain
from arguing disposition or type of sentence to the court. While
the defendant was held in the Department of Corrections for a
diagnostic study, the prosecutor's office sent a letter to the superintendent of the facilities in which defendant was detained,
arguing, in effect, that defendant should be sent to state prison.
Prior to the formal sentencing hearing, the prosecutor argued in
the judge's chambers for imposition of a prison sentence." When
formally arraigned for sentencing, the defendant moved to withdraw his plea, claiming the prosecutor breached the bargain. Although both the diagnostic study and the probation officer recommended a suspended sentence along with time in the county
jail, the judge sentenced the defendant to state prison.
While recognizing that the proper "remedy differs depending upon the nature of the breach and which party is seeking
specific enforcement,"48 the court noted that "a defendant
should not be entitled to enforce an agreement between himself
44. 19 Cal. 3d I, 559 P.2d 1028, 136 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1977).
45. [d. at 13, 559 P.2d at 1036, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 417. The prosecution argued that
the defendant should be arraigned for sentencing, the prosecutor's letter stricken from
the record and the prosecutor be ordered to comply with the terms of the agreement.
46. [d. at 13, 559 P.2d at 1037, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
47. [d. at 11, 559 P.2d at 1035, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
48. [d. at 13, 559 P.2d at 1037, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
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and the prosecutor calling for a particular disposition against
the trial court absent very special circumstances."49 The court
stated that "specific enforcement . . . must be strictly limited
because it is not intended that a defendant and prosecutor
should be able to bind a trial court which is required to weigh
the pre-sentence report and exercise its customary sentencing
discretion,"lo and, consequently, the preferred remedy is to allow plea withdrawal to restore the proceedings to the status
quo. II
Although specific enforcement did not bind the trial judge
here, the court found specific enforcement would not repair the
harm caused by the prosecutor's breach because it would be inappropriate to require defendant to undergo another diagnostic
study not tainted by the prosecutor's letter. I I Another factor was
the deliberate and wilful nature of the breach. IS
It appears that in determining the proper remedy for a plea

bargained agreement breached by the judge, the overriding concerns of the court are two-fold: (1) The deference to the trial
court's discretion to withdraw its prior approval of a plea bargained agreement upon weighing the presentencing reports;14
and (2) the probability of returning the defendant to his preplea bargained position. I I While these seem to be the logical elements with which the court would concern itself, the Calloway
decision diminishes, if not destroys, the importance of this latter
concern.
III.

A.

PEOPLE v. CALLOWAY
FACTS

Calloway entered into a plea bargain, approved by the
judge, in which he admitted violating the terms of his probation
(based on a battery conviction) and accepted a 90-day prison
49.Id.
50. Id. at 14, 559 P.2d at 1036·37, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 417·18.
51. [d. at 13·14, 559 P.2d at 1036, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
52. Id. Although the diagnostic evaluation did not recommend state prison, it was
entirely possible that the study would have made an even more lenient recommendation
had it not been influenced by the prosecutor's letter.
53. Id. at 14, 559 P.2d at 1037, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
54. See People v. Johnson, 10 Cal. 3d at 873, 519 P.2d at 607, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
55. See People v. Kaanehe, 19 Cal. 3d at 14, 559 P.2d at 1036, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
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commitment for a diagnostic study pursuant to California Penal
Code section 1203.03. 1141 In return, the judge promised to make no
finding concerning the other allegations of probation violationll7
and not to sentence him to state prison. 1I8 After reading the section 1203.03 report recommending revocation of probation, the
judge sentenced Calloway to two years in state prison. Neither
the deputy district attorney nor the deputy public defender attending the sentencing proceedings had been present when the
original bargain was struck. Consequently, neither party reminded the judge of the bargain.
A week later, Calloway wrote a letter to the judge reminding
him of the plea bargain. The letter was treated as an ex parte
request for rehearing and denied. Six months later Calloway was
released on bail pending appeal. lie

B.

MAJORITY'S ANALYSIS

Because Calloway did not receive an opportunity to withdraw his plea after the judge had reneged on the bargain, both
the prosecution and the defense counsel agreed that the judgment could not stand. Consequently, the court had to decide the
appropriate remedy for Calloway's breached plea bargain. The
majority, in a 4-3 decision,eo limited defendant's remedy to plea
56. CAL. PENAL CODI! § 1203.03 (West 1970) provides, in relevant part: "(a) In any
case in which a defendant is convicted of an offense punishable by imprisonment in the
state prison, the court ... may order that defendant be placed temporarily with a diagnostic facility of the Department of Corrections for a period not to exceed 90 days

"
57. Those violations were the failure to obey instructions of probations officers, desertion from probation, and failure to report to probation officers. 29 Cal. 3d at 669, 631
P.2d at 31, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
58. The language of the judge is helpful in understanding the bargain:
My agreement on the record between the diatrict attorney
and your attorney is that 1 will not sentence you to the state
prison when you return [from the section 1203.03 study). I
will either sentence you to the county jail, put you back on
probation, perhaps terminate probation completely in this
case, allow you to have probation on your municipal court case
... , change the conditions of probation. 1 am really not telling you what 1 am going to do, but 1 am making a commitment that you will not be sent to state prison.
1d. at 675, 631 P.2d at 34, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 600 (emphasis in original).
59. 1d. at 670, 631 P.2d at 31-32, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 597-98.
60. Joining the court's majority opinion were Justices Tobriner, Mosk, Richardson,
and Stephens. The dissenting opinion was written by Chief Justice Bird; Justices Newman, and Woods concurring in the dissent.
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withdrawal, citing Johnson as controlling.
Calloway argued that Johnson was predicated upon section
1192.5 which is applicable only when a defendant enters a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere to an accusatory pleading charging a
felony, thus not applicable to an admission of a probation violation. The court rejected this argument, noting that the underlying principles of that section and Johnson apply, since it is no
more appropriate for an appellate court to interfere with a trial
court's discretion in this case when it would be in a case involving a guilty plea to a felony.81 Defendant further argued that his
case presented the "very special circumstances" discussed in
Kaanehe which entitled him to specific performance of the plea
bargain, since he had already spent six months in prison in reliance on the plea bargain. The court responded that Johnson
spent far more than six months in prison and was not entitled to
specific performance. The court also noted that "[i)n light of
[Calloway's) inad~quate performance on probation, fairness demanded no more than he be permitted an opportunity to withdraw his admission of probation violation and plead anew to the
charge. "81
The majority quickly disposed of People v. Flores where the
defendant was allowed the benefit of his bargain, by noting that
it preceded the Johnson and Kaanehe decisions, wherein the
courts "expressed [their) reluctance to order specific performance of repudiated plea bargains. "8a
Similarly, the court disposed of Santobello v. New York."
In Santobello, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged
that specific performance was a viable alternative to plea withdrawal, but left the ultimate relief to the discretion of the state
courts.eII
Noting that Calloway would receive the appropriate credit
for time already served, the court emphasized his poor performance on probation, the unanimous recommendation of the diag61. 29 Cal. 3d at 672,631 P.2d at 33, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
62.Id.
63. Id. at 673, 731 P.2d at 33, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
64. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
65. Id. at 262-63.
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nostic staff favoring a prison sentence and the trial court's acceptance of that recommendation in holding that plea
withdrawal is the most appropriate remedy.66

•

C.

DISSENT

While the majority opinion relied heavily on Johnson, the
dissent found it distinguishable on several grounds. First, Calloway did not misrepresent himself to the court as did Johnson.6'
When the court became aware of Johnson's misrepresentations,
it withdrew its prior approval of the plea bargain.
Second, Calloway, unlike Johnson, had agreed to submit to
a section 1203.03 study in reliance on the court's promise,
thereby giving up his freedom prior to sentencing. Since Calloway was at liberty on his own recognizance prior to the bargain,
his submission to the section 1203.03 study involved a change in
the status quo. This element of detrimental reliance is not normally present in plea bargains, which usually involve no change
in custody status between entry of plea and actual sentencing
and, consequently, plea withdrawal is inadequate to return the
defendant to the status quo ante.
Furthermore, Johnson did not argue that due process and
fundamental fairness required specific enforcement; "[e]ven if
he had, his own misrepresentations to the court to obtain the
plea bargain undercut any equitable claim he might have had to
the enforcement of the bargain. "6S Finally, the main issue in
Johnson was whether defendant would be allowed to withdraw
his plea, not whether he was entitled to specific enforcement."
The dissent relied on Santobello'o in arguing that due pro66. 29 Cal. 3d at 673, 631 P.2d at 33, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
67. See People v. Johnson, 10 Cal. 3d at 870·71,519 P.2d at 605, 112 Cal. Rptr. at
557.
68. 29 Cal. 3d at 678, 631 P.2d at 36, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
69. The specific performance issue was brought up at oral argument but was not
briefed, which hampered the court's adjudication of possible remedies for broken plea
bargains. Id. at n.2, 631 P.2d at 36 n.2, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 602 n.2.
70. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). There has been some dispute over the Santobello decision.
It is not clear whether the Court considered the choice of remedies in a broken plea
bargain to be a matter of the state law or of constitutional grounds. See generally Westen & Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea Bargains, 66 CALIF. L.
REV. 471 (1978); Note, The Legitimation of Plea Bargaining: Remedies for Broken
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cess required specific performance. The Santobello court noted
that due process considerations govern the remedy when a plea
bargain is breached and the variations in plea bargain violations
are such that no absolute rule can be formulated that will fit
every case.?l
People u. Kaanehe also illustrated the proposition that a
remedy for a broken plea bargain depends on the case. As the
court stated: "Specific performance of a plea bargain agreement
is actually a broad term c'overing several different types of relief.
The remedy differs depending upon the nature of the breach
and the party which is seeking specific enforcement.'m

IV. ANALYSIS AND ALTERNATIVES
Many of the California cases dealing with the question of
remedies available to a criminal defendant when the court
breaks a plea bargained agreement mention specific enforcement
as an alternative to plea withdrawal. Some courts recognize that
for fairness reasons plea withdrawal is not always the most appropriate. 78 The issue the cases rarely address is when a defendant is entitled to choose his remedy. The only guideline offered
by the courts on this question is the "very special circumstances" criteria mentioned in Kaanehe.?4 Although the courts,
so far, have declined to elaborate on what factors may constitute
"very special circumstances," perhaps it is those factors which
would deprive a defendant of his due proces rights if the defendant is not afforded his choice of remedy for a broken plea bargain. Because section 1192.5 allows plea withdrawal in the event
of a broken plea agreement, the "very special circumstances"
guideline will only apply in situations where a defendant seeks
specific enforcement.
Promises, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 771, 792-94 (1973).
71. See 404 U.S. 257, 262-63; id. at 267 (Douglas J. concurring); id. at 267-68 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
72. 19 Cal. 3d at 13, 559 P.2d at 1036, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
73. See, e.g., James v. Smith, 445 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Carter,
454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933 (1973); People v. Eck, 39 Mich.
App. 176, 197 N.W.2d 289 (1972). See also Fischer, Beyond Santobello-Remedies for
Reneged Plea Bargains, 2 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 121 (1973). For a discussion of two different theories upon which relief is granted to defendants whose bargains have been broken, see Comment, Remedies for Reneged Plea Bargains in California, 16 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 103 (1975).
74. 19 Cal. 3d at 13, 559 P.2d at 1036, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
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The degree to which a defendant's due process rights may
be violated by the preclusion of specific enforcement as a remedy for a broken plea agreement appears to depend, at present,
on how one reads the Santobello decision. Because the Supreme
Court remanded the case to the New York State courts to determine whether plea withdrawal or specific enforcement of the
state's promise was the appropriate remedy, the Supreme Court
avoided deciding which form of relief was constitutionally required. This could be interpreted as a recognition that the
choice of remedies is entirely a matter of state law, since, in his
opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Burger left the choice of
remedy "to the discretion of the state court."'JII However, he also
said that in exercising its discretion, the state court should decide whether the circumstances of the case "requires" specific
enforcement or recession,78 implying that the state court's discretion is subject to constitutional constraints and ultimate review by the Supreme Court. Apparently, this was Justice Douglas' interpretation since he concurred in the decision, although
he clearly considered the choice of remedies to be a matter of
constitutional law."
Regardless of whether a specific remedy is constitutionally
required, there is another, albeit less compelling, reason for
granting specific enforcement of a plea bargained agreement: In
some circumstances, specific enforcement may be the only incentive for a defendant to agree to enter the plea bargaining
process.
Plea bargaining is highly desirable to the criminal justice
system because it benefits both the state and the defendant. As
one court noted, "[t]he advantages to the state and society ...
are that prompt punishment attains society's objectives of punishment more effectively than belated punishment; bargaining
results in saving judicial and prosecutorial resources so that
more time can be conserved for cases that involve substantive
issues of a defendant's guilt; a defendant who pleads guilty is
more remorseful and more likely to be 8uccesfully rehabilitated."" Furthermore, the defendant is able to enjoy the fruits
75. 404 U.S. at 263.
76.ld.
77. ld. at 267.
78. People v. Barnett, 113 Cal. App. 3d 563, 571,170 Cal. Rptr. 255, 259 (1980). See
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of his negotiations and can avoid the uncertainties and possible
embarrassment accompanying trial."
For plea bargaining to function effectively, judges and prosecutors should be mindful of the goals which the plea bargaining
process attains and recognize that a defendant's willingness to
waive his constitutional rights is the essential factor upon which
the process hinges. The willingness of a defendant to enter into
a plea agreement is largely dependent upon the capacity of the
available remedy, in the event of breach, to return him to his
original position. Where a defendant offers only to plead guilty
in exchange for a lighter sentence or a lesser charge, plea withdrawal will return the defendant to the original status quo.
However, in other plea bargained agreements this is not always
possible. In some instances, the defendant may provide the prosecution with assistance'O or information81 involving significant
risks and inconvenience, or as in Calloway, a changed position in
reliance on the bargain, so that the pre-plea bargained status
quo cannot be restored by plea withdrawal.
In cases where plea withdrawal does not restore the defendant to his original position, the court is depriving defendant of
most, if not all, the benefits which the defendant seeks in entering plea bargaining negotiations. It is in these situations that the
appellate courts need guidelines to aid them is determining just
how far a trial judge can go in rejecting a plea bargain after receiving the benefits of it. The Calloway case would have been an
appropriate vehicle for an elaboration of the "very special circumstances" guideline set forth in Kaanehe. The determination
is best done on a case-by-case basis because of the numerous
also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1977).

79. 113 Cal. App. 3d at 571, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 259. When the original charge carries
repugnant stigma, such as a sex crime, the defendant may avoid publicity, by. pleading to
a less repugnant offense. E.g., State v. Ashby, 43 N.J. 273, 204 A.2d 1 (1964) (defendant
pleaded guilty to five indictments for disorderly conduct in return for dismissal of five
indictments for open lewdness).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Paiva, 294 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1969) (identification
of forged bonds); People v. Wadkins, 63 Cal. 2d 110, 403 P.2d 429, 45 Cal. Rptr. 173
(1965) (defendant's risky acquisition of weapons used in robbery); Commonwealth v.
Todd, 186 Pa. Super. 272, 142 A.2d 174(1958) (defendant assisted in apprehension and
conviction of narcotics violators by testifying before ground jury and trial court).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 933 (1973); Ward v. United States, 116 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1940); United States v.
Paiva, 294 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1969).
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forms plea bargains can take and the many situations to which
they may lead.
It is urged by the dissent in Calloway and endorsed by this
author that the "competing interests of the defendant and the
state should be weighted in deciding the appropriate remedy for
a broken plea bargain."as Factors favoring the prosecution's or
court's choice of remedy are: (1) fraud by the defendant in obtaining the plea bargain; (2) additional damaging information
about the defendant that is later developed; and (3) changed circumstances occurring between entry of plea and time of sentencing which place the defendant in a less favorable light. Factors
favoring the defendant's choice of remedy are: (1) full performance by defendant of his part of the bargain, especially if he has
begun a term of imprisonment; and (2) a willful and deliberate
breach of a plea bargain by a prosecutor or the court.aa
The majority in Calloway relied on basically three factors in
determining that plea withdrawal was the appropriate remedy.
First, the court is reluctant to interfere with the broad discretion
afforded the trial judge by section 1192.5 to withdraw his approval of a negotiated plea. 84 While this factor is important, it is
present in every case where'a plea bargain is breached and, in a
sense, creates a presumption favoring the trial court's disposition of the case. Other than this presumption, however, the trial
court's discretion should carry no weight.
Second, the majority noted: "In light of defendant's inadequate performance on probation, fairness demands no more than
that he be permitted an opportunity to withdraw his admission
of probation violation and plead anew to that charge.''B1l
Third, the court appeared impressed with the unanimous
recommendation of the diagnostic staff favoring imposition of a
prison sentence. a8
As to the second and third factors, although Calloway's pa82. 29 Cal. 3d at 678·79 n.3, 631 P.2d at 37 n.3, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 603 n.3.
83.Id.
84. Id. at 673, 631 P.2d at 33, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
85. Id. at 672,631 P.2d at 33, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
86. Id. at 673, 631 P.2d at 33, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 599.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss2/7

16

Butler: Plea Bargain Enforcement

1982]

PLEA BARGAIN ENFORCEMENT

503

role performance was grossly inadequate, the probation reports
were before the trial court at the time the bargain was struck,8?
and, as such, do not constitute additional information later developed as in the Johnson case. 88
V. CONCLUSION
California courts have not readily agreed with criminal defendants' contentions that they should be allowed the option of
specific enforcement of a plea bargained agreement when broken
by the court. While recognizing the possible availability of specific enforcement in this context under "very special circumstances,"89 the courts do not attempt to explain what type of
circumstances may lead to this remedy. The factors present in
Calloway seem to be a persuasive case for this type of remedy.
Admittedly, the courts are constrained by the legislative
remedies imposed by Penal Code section 1192.5, which does not
mention specific enforcement as an alternative remedy. Yet
there must be a limit to the lengths a court will go in assuming
that plea withdrawal will, in all cases, restore the status quo. At
some point, due process may require specific enforcement of a
broken plea bargain. eo Until that time arrives, the structure of
the plea bargaining system should not be undermined by preclusion of the specific enforcement remedy when fairness requires
it.
For defendants to be willing to enter into the process, they
need some guarantee that their plea bargains will be honored or,
at least, that they can return unharmed to their pre-plea bargained positions. Even in cases where the status quo can be restored by plea withdrawal, a defendant must start again at
square one of the judicial process after, in many cases, considerable time and money are spent in an attempt to plea bargain. In
the long run, this tends to frustrate one of the main purposes for
87. Jd. at 676, 631 P.2d at 35, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 601.

88. 10 Cal. 3d at 870, 519 P.2d at 605, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 557.
89. People v. Kaanehe, 19 Cal. 3d at 13, 559 P.2d at 1036, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
90. People v. Calloway, 29 Cal. 3d at 680,631 P.2d at 38,175 Cal. Rptr. at 604 (Bird,
C. J., dissenting); See generally, Westen & Westin, supra note 70.
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which the plea bargaining process was created-to decrease the
already overcrowded court dockets.
Lawrence E. Butler
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